Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.03.002MaRDI QIDQ608549zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philipp C. Wichardt

Publication date 25 November 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitychain store paradoxfinite automataimperfect recalllimited foresightreasoning by analogy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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• Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach
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Cites work

• A backward induction experiment
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
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• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
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• On the centipede game
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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Sequential Equilibria
• The absent-minded driver's paradox: Synthesis and responses
• The chain store paradox
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

Cited in

(7)

• The chain store paradox
• Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach
• On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Limited foresight equilibrium
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Analogies, adaptation, and anomalies

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