Should fiscal policies be centralized in a monetary union? A dynamic game approach

DOI10.1007/s10100-023-00846-4OpenAlexW4360980371MaRDI QIDQ6090373

Viktoria Blueschke-Nikolaeva, Reinhard Neck, Dmitri Blueschke

Publication date: 14 November 2023

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-023-00846-4

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsmonetary uniondynamic gamepublic debtPareto solutionfeedback Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices
• Dynamic modelling of monetary and fiscal cooperation among nations
• Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game
• Game of thrones: accommodating monetary policies in a monetary union
• How relieving is public debt relief? Monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union during a debt crisis
• OPTGAME3: A Dynamic Game Solver and an Economic Example
• Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory
• Models of Endogenous Coalition Formation Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in the Presence of a Monetary Union

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