Who should be regulated: genuine producers or third parties?
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Publication:6101003
DOI10.1007/s00712-022-00808-5zbMath1518.91091OpenAlexW4311623897MaRDI QIDQ6101003
Keisaku Higashida, Keisuke Hattori
Publication date: 20 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00808-5
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91)
Cites Work
- Counterfeiting, enforcement and social welfare
- Two-dimensional vertical differentiation with attribute dependence
- Endogenous vertical segmentation in a Cournot oligopoly
- Environmental quality competition and eco-labeling.
- Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation
- Brand premia driven by perceived vertical differentiation in markets with information disparity and optimistic consumers
- Fines imposed on counterfeiters and pocketed by the genuine firm. A differential game approach
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