Assessing and Countering Reaction Attacks Against Post-Quantum Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on QC-LDPC Codes

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-00434-7_16MaRDI QIDQ6104629zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors P. M. Santini, Marco Baldi, Franco Chiaraluce

Publication date 28 June 2023

Published in Cryptology and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.01945

zbMATH Keywords

code-based cryptographyMcEliece cryptosystemNiederreiter cryptosystempost-quantum cryptographyquasi-cyclic low-density parity-check codes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94) Cryptography (94A60)

Abstract: Code-based public-key cryptosystems based on QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC codes are promising post-quantum candidates to replace quantum vulnerable classical alternatives. However, a new type of attacks based on Bob's reactions have recently been introduced and appear to significantly reduce the length of the life of any keypair used in these systems. In this paper we estimate the complexity of all known reaction attacks against QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based variants of the McEliece cryptosystem. We also show how the structure of the secret key and, in particular, the secret code rate affect the complexity of these attacks. It follows from our results that QC-LDPC code-based systems can indeed withstand reaction attacks, on condition that some specific decoding algorithms are used and the secret code has a sufficiently high rate.

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Cited in

(5)

• A reaction attack on the QC-LDPC McEliece cryptosystem
• A closer look at the Guo-Johansson-Stankovski attack against QC-MDPC codes
• A reaction attack against cryptosystems based on LRPC codes
• Cryptanalysis of a rank-based signature with short public keys
• Analysis of reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes

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