Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAC035MaRDI QIDQ6104783zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel F. Garrett, James W. Roberts, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato

Publication date 28 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w23473.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsimperfect competitionmunicipal bondspass-throughtaxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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(4)

• A note on the nonneutral taxation of indexed government bonds under alternative indexation schemes
• True Interest Cost in Municipal Bond Bidding: An Integer Programming Approach
• The political economy of municipal bankruptcy
• Search frictions and product design in the municipal bond market

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