Preferences and Performance in Simultaneous First-Price Auctions: A Structural Analysis

DOI10.1093/restud/rdac030zbMath1519.91124OpenAlexW4283801849MaRDI QIDQ6104784

Tatiana Komarova, Matthew Gentry, Pasquale Schiraldi

Publication date: 28 June 2023

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac030

zbMATH Keywords

identificationauctionscomplementarities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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