Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105672MaRDI QIDQ6111178zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Todd Keister, Yuliyan Mitkov

Publication date 6 July 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228852

zbMATH Keywords

bank bailoutsbanking regulationfinancial stabilitymoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

Recommendations

• Optimal bailouts, bank's incentive and risk
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Cites work

• A theory of liquidity and regulation of financial intermediation
• Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
• Bailouts and financial fragility
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Interest rates and financial fragility
• Optimal Delegation
• Optimal Diamond-Dybvig mechanism in large economies with aggregate uncertainty
• Preventing bank runs
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps

Cited in

(19)

• To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model
• Bail-in regulation and stock market reaction
• Optimal bailouts, bank's incentive and risk
• Efficient ex-ante stabilization of firms
• Looting and risk shifting in banking crises
• A two-stage call-put-pricing framework for a ``bad bank solution and bank profitability
• Market financing of bail-out targets
• Bailouts and financial fragility
• Optimal bank regulation and fiscal capacity
• Financial safety nets
• Prudential capital controls or bailouts? The impact of different collateral constraint assumptions
• Why did sponsor banks rescue their SIVs? A signaling model of rescues
• Let the Worst One Fail: A Credible Solution to the Too-Big-To-Fail Conundrum
• Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
• Bank bailouts: moral hazard and commitment
• Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack
• Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding
• Hands in the cookie jar: exploiting loan loss provisions under bank financial distress
• State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics

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