The cooperative evolution in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game with the local loyalty of two-strategy

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2023.128484MaRDI QIDQ6128686zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 16 April 2024

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2023.128484

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationspatial prisoner's dilemma gamelocal loyalty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx) Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

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