Effects of individual and collective decision rule on cooperation in public goods game

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2024.128553OpenAlexW4391123157WikidataQ129600814 ScholiaQ129600814MaRDI QIDQ6130105FDOQ6130105

Authors: Jalal Eddine Bahbouhi, Saif Islam Bouderba, Abdelali Elkouay, Najem Moussa 

Publication date: 18 April 2024

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2024.128553

Recommendations

• Synergistic effects of adaptive reward and reinforcement learning rules on cooperation
• Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
• Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives
• Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
• The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypublic goods gamepunishmentfree ridersreward

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)

Cited In (3)

• Synergistic effects of adaptive reward and reinforcement learning rules on cooperation
• Farmer's Game: a game theoretic approach towards burning of crop residue
• The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior

This page was built for publication: Effects of individual and collective decision rule on cooperation in public goods game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6130105)