Effects of individual and collective decision rule on cooperation in public goods game

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2024.128553MaRDI QIDQ6130105zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jalal Eddine Bahbouhi, Saif Islam Bouderba, Abdelali Elkouay, Najem Moussa

Publication date 18 April 2024

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2024.128553

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryfree riderspublic goods gamepunishmentreward

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)

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• Zero-determinant strategy of finite games with implementation errors and its application into group decision-making
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