Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22963-3_21MaRDI QIDQ6135414zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chris Brzuska, Antoine Delignat-Lavaud, Christoph Egger, Cédric Fournet, Konrad Kohbrok, Markulf Kohlweiss

Publication date 25 August 2023

Published in Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://hal-cnrs.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03969623

zbMATH Keywords

key scheduleprotocol analysisstate-separating proofsTLS 1.3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol
• (De-)constructing TLS 1.3
• On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode
• Proving the TLS handshake secure (as it is)
• On the security of the TLS protocol: a systematic analysis

Cites work

• A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol
• Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
• Analysing and exploiting the Mantin biases in RC4
• Augmented secure channels and the goal of the TLS 1.3 record layer
• Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE
• Cryptographic extraction and key derivation: the HKDF scheme
• Data is a stream: security of stream-based channels
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617924 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1024060 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2086716 (Why is no real title available?)
• Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard
• New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: security without collision resistance
• On the tight security of TLS 1.3: theoretically sound cryptographic parameters for real-world deployments
• PRF-ODH: relations, instantiations, and impossibility results
• Proving the TLS handshake secure (as it is)
• State separation for code-based game-playing proofs
• Tighter proofs for the SIGMA and TLS 1.3 key exchange protocols

Cited in

(14)

• A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol
• Secure communication channel establishment: TLS 1.3 (over TCP Fast Open) versus QUIC
• On the tight security of TLS 1.3: theoretically sound cryptographic parameters for real-world deployments
• Analysing the HPKE standard
• Multipath TLS 1.3
• On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode
• (De-)constructing TLS 1.3
• Advance in TLS 1.3 protocol studies
• Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard
• When messages are keys: is HMAC a dual-PRF?
• Symmetric and dual PRFs from standard assumptions: a generic validation of a prevailing assumption
• How hard can it be to formalize a proof? Lessons from formalizing \texttt{CryptoBox} three times in EasyCrypt
• Key derivation functions without a grain of salt
• Post-quantum TLS 1.3 handshake from CPA-secure KEMs with tighter reductions

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