Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00865-0MaRDI QIDQ6146789zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Agustín G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 31 January 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.16293

zbMATH Keywords

corematching with indifferencesstabilitystrong corestrong stabilitysuper coresuper stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the strong core coincides with the strongly stable set, and (iii) the super core coincides with the super stable set. We also show how the core and the strong core in markets with indifferences relate to the stable matchings of their associated tie-breaking strict markets.

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Cites work

• An algorithm for the maximum weight strongly stable matching problem
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Cited in

(2)

• Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
• The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view

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