Effects of partial passive ownership in a successive endogenous timing game with R&D spillovers
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Publication:6154059
Cites work
- Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another
- Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under R&D competition: Output versus R&D subsidies
- Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition: input versus output spillovers
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with foreign competitors: the linear demand case
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes
- On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
- Overlapping ownership, endogenous quality, and welfare
- Partial passive ownership holdings and licensing
- Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings
- R&D spillovers, output subsidies, and privatization in a mixed duopoly: Flexible versus irreversible R&D investments
- Sequencing R\&D decisions in a two-period duopoly with spillovers
- Shareholding interlocks: profit formulations and cartelizing effects
- Silent financial interests and product innovation
- Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership
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