Stability of dining clubs in the Kolkata paise restaurant problem with and without cheating

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Publication:6158895

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2023.128767arXiv2302.14142OpenAlexW4366439899MaRDI QIDQ6158895FDOQ6158895


Authors: Akshat Harlalka, Andrew Belmonte, Christopher Griffin Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 31 May 2023

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We introduce the idea of a dining club to the Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem. In this problem, N agents choose (randomly) among N restaurants, but if multiple agents choose the same restaurant, only one will eat. Agents in the dining club will coordinate their restaurant choice to avoid choice collision and increase their probability of eating. We model the problem of deciding whether to join the dining club as an evolutionary game and show that the strategy of joining the dining club is evolutionarily stable. We then introduce an optimized member tax to those individuals in the dining club, which is used to provide a safety net for those group members who don't eat because of collision with a non-dining club member. When non-dining club members are allowed to cheat and share communal food within the dining club, we show that a new unstable fixed point emerges in the dynamics. A bifurcation analysis is performed in this case. To conclude our theoretical study, we then introduce evolutionary dynamics for the cheater population and study these dynamics. Numerical experiments illustrate the behaviour of the system with more than one dining club and show several potential areas for future research.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.14142




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