Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
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Recommendations
- A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission
- The communication cost of selfishness
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- The value of mediated communication
- Equilibrium selection in information elicitation without verification via information monotonicity
Cites work
- A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
- A model of expertise
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
- Hierarchical cheap talk
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly
- Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Strategic information transmission networks
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
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