A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities
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Cites work
- A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- An uncomparable tool: the ultrafilter
- Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
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- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle
- Model theory
- Non-standard analysis
- On Arrow-type impossibility theorems with infinite individuals and infinite alternatives
- Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Some applications of the notions of forcing and generic sets
- The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer
- The Power of the Ultrafilter Theorem
- The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice
- Ultraproducts and aggregation
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
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