Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226089
- Timing of Effort and Reward: Three-Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model
Cites work
- A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
- Incentives, insurance, and the variability of consumption and leisure
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
- Repeated moral hazard with persistence
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Cited in
(7)- Optimal insurance contracts for a shot-noise Cox claim process and persistent insured's actions
- Timing of Effort and Reward: Three-Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model
- Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
- A dynamic model of settlement
- Repeated moral hazard with persistence
- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
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