Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties?

DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03234-0zbMath1529.03063OpenAlexW3168738449MaRDI QIDQ6187753

David Liggins

Publication date: 1 February 2024

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03234-0

zbMATH Keywords

propertiessecond-order quantificationhigher-order quantificationhigher-order metaphysics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

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• Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language
• The logic and meaning of plurals. II
• On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification
• On What There's Not
• Nominalist Realism*
• What Truth Is
• Plural Logic
• Nominalism Through De‐Nominalization
• Plural Quantification Exposed
• Modal Logic as Metaphysics

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