Should a higher-order metaphysician believe in properties?
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Publication:6187753
DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03234-0zbMath1529.03063OpenAlexW3168738449MaRDI QIDQ6187753
Publication date: 1 February 2024
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03234-0
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)
Cites Work
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- Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language
- The logic and meaning of plurals. II
- On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification
- On What There's Not
- Nominalist Realism*
- What Truth Is
- Plural Logic
- Nominalism Through De‐Nominalization
- Plural Quantification Exposed
- Modal Logic as Metaphysics
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