How (not) to construct worlds with responsibility

DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03252-yzbMath1529.03111OpenAlexW3181990299MaRDI QIDQ6187760

Fabio Lampert, Pedro Merlussi

Publication date: 1 February 2024

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03252-y

zbMATH Keywords

paradoxpossible worldsfree willpropositionsstates of affairsmoral responsibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• From worlds to possibilities
• A theory of truthmaker content. I: Conjunction, disjunction and negation
• A theory of truthmaker content. II: Subject-matter, common content, remainder and ground
• On an unsound proof of the existence of possible worlds
• Are There Set Theoretic Possible Worlds?
• Sets and worlds again
• A NEGLECTED RESOLUTION OF RUSSELL’S PARADOX OF PROPOSITIONS
• Events and Propositions
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