Machine-checked security for XMSS as in RFC 8391 and SPHINCS\textsuperscript{+}
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Publication:6190145
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-38554-4_14OpenAlexW4385654393MaRDI QIDQ6190145
Andreas Hülsing, François Dupressoir, Manuel Barbosa, Pierre-Yves Strub, Benjamin Grégoire, Matthias Meijers
Publication date: 6 February 2024
Published in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2023 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38554-4_14
formal verificationXMSScomputer-aided cryptographyEasyCryptmachine-checked proofsSPHINCS\textsuperscript{+}
Cites Work
- Critical perspectives on provable security: fifteen years of ``another look papers
- How to record quantum queries, and applications to quantum indifferentiability
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- Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs
- Beyond Provable Security Verifiable IND-CCA Security of OAEP
- Recovering the tight security proof of SPHINCS\textsuperscript{+}
- Formal verification of Saber's public-key encryption scheme in easycrypt
- Tight adaptive reprogramming in the QROM
- Breaking category five \(\mathrm{SPHINCS}^+\) with SHA-256