The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2022.1263arXiv1905.05165OpenAlexW2944644116WikidataQ113749908 ScholiaQ113749908MaRDI QIDQ6199243FDOQ6199243

Authors: Siddharth Barman, Federico Echenique 

Publication date: 23 February 2024

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.05165

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zbMATH Keywords

Walrasian equilibriumcore convergencepiecewise-linear concave utilitiesapproximate Carathéodory theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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