New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms
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Publication:6199244
DOI10.1287/MOOR.2022.1264arXiv1805.04190OpenAlexW4280554595MaRDI QIDQ6199244
Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre, Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier
Publication date: 23 February 2024
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.04190
machine schedulingextensive form mechanismsset systemsdeferred acceptance algorithmsobviously strategyproof mechanisms
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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