Equilibrium and efficiency in conflict analysis incorporating permissibility
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Publication:6201669
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-33780-2_8OpenAlexW4377230833MaRDI QIDQ6201669FDOQ6201669
Authors: Yukiko Kato 
Publication date: 25 March 2024
Published in: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33780-2_8
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Cites Work
- Non-cooperative games
- Rough sets
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Variable precision rough set model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Upper and lower probabilistic preferences in the graph model for conflict resolution
- Coarse decision making and overfitting
- Optimal categorization
- The graph model for conflicts
- Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
- Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
- Common knowledge revisited
- Interval fuzzy preferences in the graph model for conflict resolution
- Fuzzy option prioritization for the graph model for conflict resolution
- Fuzzy preferences in multiple participant decision making
- State transition for de-escalation in the graph model for conflict resolution framework
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