Jamming in multiple independent Gaussian channels as a game

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-16989-3_1MaRDI QIDQ6201684OpenAlexFDO

Authors Michail Fasoulakis, Apostolos Traganitis, Anthony Ephremides

Publication date 25 March 2024

Published in Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.09749

zbMATH Keywords

zero-sum gamewireless communicationsjammingGaussian channels

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Abstract: We study the problem of emph{jamming} in multiple independent emph{Gaussian channels} as a zero-sum game. We show that in the unique Nash equilibrium of the game the best-response strategy of the transmitter is the emph{waterfilling} to the sum of the jamming and the noise power in each channel and the best-response strategy of the jammer is the emph{waterfilling} only to the noise power.

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