Revisiting Optimal Resilience of Fast Byzantine Consensus

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Publication:6201962

DOI10.1145/3465084.3467924arXiv2102.12825OpenAlexW3186862114MaRDI QIDQ6201962FDOQ6201962


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Publication date: 26 March 2024

Published in: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: It is a common belief that Byzantine fault-tolerant solutions for consensus are significantly slower than their crash fault-tolerant counterparts. Indeed, in PBFT, the most widely known Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol, it takes three message delays to decide a value, in contrast with just two in Paxos. This motivates the search for fast Byzantine consensus algorithms that can produce decisions after just two message delays emph{in the common case}, e.g., under the assumption that the current leader is correct and not suspected by correct processes. The (optimal) two-step latency comes with the cost of lower resilience: fast Byzantine consensus requires more processes to tolerate the same number of faults. In particular, 5f+1 processes were claimed to be necessary to tolerate f Byzantine failures. In this paper, we present a fast Byzantine consensus algorithm that relies on just 5f1 processes. Moreover, we show that 5f1 is the tight lower bound, correcting a mistake in the earlier work. While the difference of just 2 processes may appear insignificant for large values of f, it can be crucial for systems of a smaller scale. In particular, for f=1, our algorithm requires only 4 processes, which is optimal for any (not necessarily fast) partially synchronous Byzantine consensus algorithm.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.12825








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