Optimal Clock Synchronization with Signatures

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Publication:6202201

DOI10.1145/3519270.3538444arXiv2203.02553MaRDI QIDQ6202201FDOQ6202201

Christoph Lenzen, Julian Loss

Publication date: 26 March 2024

Published in: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Cryptographic signatures can be used to increase the resilience of distributed systems against adversarial attacks, by increasing the number of faulty parties that can be tolerated. While this is well-studied for consensus, it has been underexplored in the context of fault-tolerant clock synchronization, even in fully connected systems. Here, the honest parties of an n-node system are required to compute output clocks of small skew (i.e., maximum phase offset) despite local clock rates varying between 1 and vartheta>1, end-to-end communication delays varying between du and d, and the interference from malicious parties. So far, it is only known that clock pulses of skew d can be generated with (trivially optimal) resilience of lceiln/2ceil1 (PODC `19), improving over the tight bound of lceiln/3ceil1 holding without signatures for emph{any} skew bound (STOC `84, PODC `85). Since typically dggu and vartheta1ll1, this is far from the lower bound of u+(vartheta1)d that applies even in the fault-free case (IPL `01). We prove matching upper and lower bounds of Theta(u+(vartheta1)d) on the skew for the resilience range from lceiln/3ceil to lceiln/2ceil1. The algorithm showing the upper bound is, under the assumption that the adversary cannot forge signatures, deterministic. The lower bound holds even if clocks are initially perfectly synchronized, message delays between honest nodes are known, vartheta is arbitrarily close to one, and the synchronization algorithm is randomized. This has crucial implications for network designers that seek to leverage signatures for providing more robust time. In contrast to the setting without signatures, they must ensure that an attacker cannot easily bypass the lower bound on the delay on links with a faulty endpoint.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.02553











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