Symmetry of models versus models of symmetry

arXiv0801.1966MaRDI QIDQ6208092FDOQ6208092

Enrique Miranda, Gert De Cooman

Publication date: 13 January 2008

Abstract: A model for a subject's beliefs about a phenomenon may exhibit symmetry, in the sense that it is invariant under certain transformations. On the other hand, such a belief model may be intended to represent that the subject believes or knows that the phenomenon under study exhibits symmetry. We defend the view that these are fundamentally different things, even though the difference cannot be captured by Bayesian belief models. In fact, the failure to distinguish between both situations leads to Laplace's so-called Principle of Insufficient Reason, which has been criticised extensively in the literature. We show that there are belief models (imprecise probability models, coherent lower previsions) that generalise and include the Bayesian belief models, but where this fundamental difference can be captured. This leads to two notions of symmetry for such belief models: weak invariance (representing symmetry of beliefs) and strong invariance (modelling beliefs of symmetry). We discuss various mathematical as well as more philosophical aspects of these notions. We also discuss a few examples to show the relevance of our findings both to probabilistic modelling and to statistical inference, and to the notion of exchangeability in particular.

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