The Theory of Fallible Probability and The Dynamics of Degrees of Belief

arXiv0803.0630MaRDI QIDQ6208632FDOQ6208632

Publication date: 5 March 2008

Abstract: This monograph is an account of the theory of fallible probability and of the dynamics of degrees of belief. It discusses the first order subjective theory in which first order degrees of belief are expressed by subjective probabilities and are updated by conditionalization (Bayes, 1764; Ramsey, 1926), gives an improved exposition of the greater part of the author's theory of Probability Dynamics (Nathan, 2006) which should replace the so-called Probability Kinematics (Jeffrey, 1965), resolves the problem of New Explanation of Old Evidence (Jeffrey, 1995), provides a Theory of Confirmation, and refutes the Principle of Reflection (Van Fraassen, 1984).

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