Forcing Iterated Admissibility in Strategic Belief Models

arXiv1205.0444MaRDI QIDQ6232728FDOQ6232728

Authors: Fernando Tohmé, Gianluca Caterina, Rocco Gangle 

Publication date: 2 May 2012

Abstract: Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated in recent times: it has been shown that strategies surviving m+1 rounds of iterated admissibility may be identified as those that are obtained under a condition called rationality and m assumption of rationality (RmAR) in complete lexicographic type structures. On the other hand, it has been shown that its limit condition, $RinftyAR$, might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the class of types is complete and the types are continuous. In this paper we introduce a weaker notion of completeness which is nonetheless sufficient to characterize IA in a highly general way as the class of strategies that indeed satisfy $RinftyAR$. The key methodological innovation involves defining a new notion of generic types and employing these in conjunction with Cohen's technique of forcing.

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