An Essay on the Double Nature of the Probability

arXiv1301.5443MaRDI QIDQ6238968FDOQ6238968

Leonida Gianfagna, Paolo Rocchi

Publication date: 23 January 2013

Abstract: Classical statistics and Bayesian statistics refer to the frequentist and subjective theories of probability respectively. Von Mises and De Finetti, who authored those conceptualizations, provide interpretations of the probability that appear incompatible. This discrepancy raises ample debates and the foundations of the probability calculus emerge as a tricky, open issue so far. Instead of developing philosophical discussion, this research resorts to analytical and mathematical methods. We present two theorems that sustain the validity of both the frequentist and the subjective views on the probability. Secondly we show how the double facets of the probability turn out to be consistent within the present logical frame.

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