Nonlinear Dynamics of the Rock-Paper-Scissors Game with Mutations

DOI10.1103/PHYSREVE.91.052907arXiv1502.03370WikidataQ46716023 ScholiaQ46716023MaRDI QIDQ6258992FDOQ6258992

Authors: Danielle F. P. Toupo, Steven Strogatz 

Publication date: 11 February 2015

Abstract: We analyze the replicator-mutator equations for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Various graph-theoretic patterns of mutation are considered, ranging from a single unidirectional mutation pathway between two of the species, to global bidirectional mutation among all the species. Our main result is that the coexistence state, in which all three species exist in equilibrium, can be destabilized by arbitrarily small mutation rates. After it loses stability, the coexistence state gives birth to a stable limit cycle solution created in a supercritical Hopf bifurcation. This attracting periodic solution exists for all the mutation patterns considered, and persists arbitrarily close to the limit of zero mutation rate and a zero-sum game.

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