Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_8MaRDI QIDQ6302256arXivFDO

Authors Alain Couvreur, Matthieu Lequesne, Jean-Pierre Tillich

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in arXiv

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94) Cryptography (94A60) Linear codes (general theory) (94B05)

arXiv classification

cs.CRcs.ITmath.IT

Abstract: We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

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