Efficiency of equilibria in games with random payoffs

arXiv2007.08518MaRDI QIDQ6345248FDOQ6345248

Authors: Matteo Quattropani, Marco Scarsini 

Publication date: 15 July 2020

Abstract: We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of players diverges. It is well-known that, if the distribution $F$ has no atoms, the random number of pure equilibria is asymptotically Poisson$(1)$. In the presence of atoms, it diverges. For each strategy profile, we consider the (random) average payoff of the players, called Average Social Utility (ASU). In particular, we examine the asymptotic behavior of the optimum ASU and the one associated to the best and worst pure Nash equilibria and we show that, although these quantities are random, they converge, as $noinfty$ to some deterministic quantities.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial probability (60C05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

This page was built for publication: Efficiency of equilibria in games with random payoffs

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6345248)