Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games
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Publication:6356048
DOI10.7566/JPSJ.90.025002arXiv2012.07659MaRDI QIDQ6356048FDOQ6356048
Publication date: 10 December 2020
Abstract: We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.
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