MFG model with a long-lived penalty at random jump times: application to demand side management for electricity contracts

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Publication:6358342

DOI10.1007/S10479-023-05270-0arXiv2101.06031MaRDI QIDQ6358342FDOQ6358342


Authors: Clémence Alasseur, Luciano Campi, Roxana Dumitrescu, Jia Zeng Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 15 January 2021

Abstract: We consider an energy system with n consumers who are linked by a Demand Side Management (DSM) contract, i.e. they agreed to diminish, at random times, their aggregated power consumption by a predefined volume during a predefined duration. Their failure to deliver the service is penalised via the difference between the sum of the n power consumptions and the contracted target. We are led to analyse a non-zero sum stochastic game with n players, where the interaction takes place through a cost which involves a delay induced by the duration included in the DSM contract. When noinfty, we obtain a Mean-Field Game (MFG) with random jump time penalty and interaction on the control. We prove a stochastic maximum principle in this context, which allows to compare the MFG solution to the optimal strategy of a central planner. In a linear quadratic setting we obtain an semi-explicit solution through a system of decoupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations with jumps, involving a Riccati Backward SDE with jumps. We show that it provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the original n-player game for n large. Finally, we propose a numerical algorithm to compute the MFG equilibrium and present several numerical experiments.













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