Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knowledge: No Luck?

arXiv2103.13332MaRDI QIDQ6363644FDOQ6363644

Publication date: 24 March 2021

Abstract: The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene or FDE. This blocks the usual road to fixed-point results for Kripke's theory of truth within these semantics and consequently the paper is predominantly an exploration of fixed point results for Kripke's theory of truth within non-monotone semantics. Using the theory of quasi-inductive definitions we show that in case of the subjunctive theories of knowledge the so-called Kripke jump will have fixed points despite the non-monotonicity of the semantics: Kripke's theory of truth can be successfully applied in the framework of subjunctive theories of knowledge.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

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