Tolerance and degrees of truth
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Publication:6406091
arXiv2207.12786MaRDI QIDQ6406091FDOQ6406091
Authors: Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley, Robert van Rooij 
Publication date: 26 July 2022
Abstract: This paper explores the relations between two logical approaches to vagueness: on the one hand the fuzzy approach defended by Smith (2008), and on the other the strict-tolerant approach defended by Cobreros, Egr'e, Ripley and van Rooij (2012). Although the former approach uses continuum many values and the latter implicitly four, we show that both approaches can be subsumed under a common three-valued framework. In particular, we defend the claim that Smith's continuum many values are not needed to solve what Smith calls `the jolt problem', and we show that they are not needed for his account of logical consequence either. Not only are three values enough to satisfy Smith's central desiderata, but they also allow us to internalize Smith's closeness principle in the form of a tolerance principle at the object-language. The reduction, we argue, matters for the justification of many-valuedness in an adequate theory of vague language.
Substructural logics (including relevance, entailment, linear logic, Lambek calculus, BCK and BCI logics) (03B47) Many-valued logic (03B50) Fuzzy logic; logic of vagueness (03B52)
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