Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0489-YzbMATH Open1235.91040OpenAlexW3124716487MaRDI QIDQ647551FDOQ647551

Katerina Sherstyuk, Arnaud Dellis, Sean D'Evelyn

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0489-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (3)

• Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
• Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
• Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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