Two presumptions in Goedel's interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning that are classically objectionable
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Publication:6479019
arXivmath/0703723MaRDI QIDQ6479019FDOQ6479019
Authors: Bhupinder Singh Anand 
Publication date: 24 March 2007
Abstract: Standard expositions of Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions are based on two presumptions in Goedel's 1931 interpretation of his own, formal, reasoning - one each in Theorem VI and in Theorem XI - which do not meet Goedel's, explicitly stated, requirement of classically constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, reasoning. We see how these objections can be addressed, and note some consequences.
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