Cost allocation problems on highways with grouped users

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2024.02.011arXiv2304.10002WikidataQ128387564 ScholiaQ128387564MaRDI QIDQ6509730FDOQ6509730

Authors: Marcos Gómez-Rodríguez, Laura Davila-Pena, Balbina Casas-Méndez 

Abstract: One of the applications of cooperative transferable utility games is the determination of the rates to be paid by the users of a given facility, whose construction or maintenance costs are to be recouped, and where certain efficiency and equity criteria inspire the solutions considered. This paper analyzes how to allocate the fixed costs of a highway among its users through tolls, considering that different classes of vehicles utilize the service. For this purpose, we make use of generalized highway games with a priori unions that represent groups such as frequent travelers or truckers with a higher bargaining power, thus obtaining reductions in their rates. In particular, results concerning the Owen value and the coalitional Tijs value are demonstrated, and a new value is provided, the so-called Shapley-Tijs value. Finally, the methodology introduced is applied to a real case of traffic data from the AP-9 highway in Spain.

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