Cost allocation and strategyproof mechanism for cover-set games

DOI10.1142/S0129626423400091MaRDI QIDQ6536202zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hao Zhang, Huahui Yu, Limin Wang, Sainan Guo

Publication date 9 April 2024

Published in Parallel Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0129626423400091

zbMATH Keywords

multicover setselfish agentstrategyproof mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• STACS 2005
• Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
• Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
• Algorithmic Applications in Management
• Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes

Cites work

• Algorithmic Applications in Management
• Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
• Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
• Equitable cost allocations via primal-dual-type algorithms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1839431 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
• Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
• Non-cooperative Facility Location and Covering Games
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

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