Price setting with strategic complementarities as a mean field game
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Cites work
- Aggregation and Optimization with State-Dependent Pricing
- Exploiting MIT shocks in heterogeneous-agent economies: the impulse response as a numerical derivative
- Fokker-Planck equations of jumping particles and mean field games of impulse control
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3905045 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47995 (Why is no real title available?)
- Income and wealth distribution in macroeconomics: a continuous-time approach
- International shocks, variable markups, and domestic prices
- Mean field games
- Menu costs, multiproduct firms, and aggregate fluctuations
- Monetary non-neutrality in a multisector menu cost model
- Optimal stopping in mean field games, an obstacle problem approach
- Price setting with strategic complementarities as a mean field game
- State-Dependent Pricing and the Dynamics of Money and Output
- The Analytic Theory of a Monetary Shock
Cited in
(8)- Price setting with strategic complementarities as a mean field game
- Strategic complementarity in games
- Caballero-Engel meet Lasry-Lions: a uniqueness result
- Empirical investigation of a sufficient statistic for monetary shocks
- Strong solutions to submodular mean field games with common noise and related McKean-Vlasov FBSDEs
- An online interactive physics-informed adversarial network for solving mean field games
- Multiple equilibria in mean-field game models of firm competition with strategic complementarities
- When Lasry-Lions meet Krugman: a mean-field game theory of spatial dynamics
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