Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

DOI10.3982/ECTA19021MaRDI QIDQ6536797zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller

Publication date 14 May 2024

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

screeningdisability insurancebenefitspolicy reform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20)

Recommendations

• Disability insurance in an optimal pension scheme
• The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s
• A model of social security disability insurance using matched SIPP/administrative data
• Disability Retirement in a Welfare State

Cites work

• A unified welfare analysis of government policies
• Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?
• Estimating Outcome Distributions for Compliers in Instrumental Variables Models
• Fuzzy differences-in-differences
• Health, economic resources and the work decisions of older men
• Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models.
• The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment
• The value of unemployment insurance
• The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s

Cited in

(2)

• Spousal labor supply, caregiving, and the value of disability insurance
• Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

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