Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

DOI10.3982/ECTA19021zbMATH Open1541.62364MaRDI QIDQ6536797FDOQ6536797

Authors: Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller 

Publication date: 14 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

screeningdisability insurancebenefitspolicy reform

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20)

Cites Work

• Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models.
• Estimating Outcome Distributions for Compliers in Instrumental Variables Models
• The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s
• The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment
• Health, economic resources and the work decisions of older men
• The value of unemployment insurance
• Fuzzy differences-in-differences
• A unified welfare analysis of government policies
• Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

Cited In (2)

• Spousal labor supply, caregiving, and the value of disability insurance
• Designing disability insurance reforms: tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits?

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