Incentives and the structure of teams
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Publication:654510
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.06.006zbMATH Open1229.91189OpenAlexW3124313814MaRDI QIDQ654510FDOQ654510
Authors: Juan-Miguel Gracia
Publication date: 28 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2009/paper_758.pdf
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Cites Work
- Assortative Matching and Search
- Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
- Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
- Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
- The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Wealth effects in the principal agent model
Cited In (11)
- On discrimination in the optimal management of teams
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Joint production in teams
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal team incentives with CES production
- Technology, team production and incentives
- Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
- Sorting expertise
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
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