Recommendations
Cites work
- Assortative Matching and Search
- Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
- Dynamic matching and evolving reputations
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
- Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
- The Dynamics of Learning with Team Production: Implications for Task Assignment
- Wealth effects in the principal agent model
Cited in
(12)- Optimal team incentives with CES production
- Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Matching with peer monitoring
- Joint production in teams
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841895 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2094740 (Why is no real title available?)
- On discrimination in the optimal management of teams
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
- Sorting expertise
- Technology, team production and incentives
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