Benefits of rent sharing in dynamic resource games

DOI10.1007/S13235-023-00528-5MaRDI QIDQ6548523zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Frederick van der Ploeg

Publication date 1 June 2024

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S13235-023-00528-5

zbMATH Keywords

hold-up problempolitical conflict cyclesrapacious depletionrent sharingresource wars

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3655624 (Why is no real title available?)
• On comparing monopoly and competition in exhaustible resource exploitation
• Resource extraction and the threat of possible expropriation: The role of Swiss bank accounts
• Temporary natural resource cartels
• The Logic of Political Violence

Cited in

(2)

• Preface: Special issue of Dynamic Games and Applications in memory of Professor Ngo Van Long
• Non-renewable resource extraction model with uncertainties

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