How do coalitions break down? An alternative view
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Publication:6548529
DOI10.1007/S13235-024-00559-6zbMATH Open1537.91232MaRDI QIDQ6548529FDOQ6548529
Authors: R. Boucekkine, Carmen Camacho, Wei H. Ruan, Benteng Zou 
Publication date: 1 June 2024
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
differential gamesenvironmental agreementsmultistage optimal controlcoalition splittingconstitutional versus technological heterogeneity
History, political science (91F10) Noncooperative games (91A10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)
Cites Work
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- Carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution: a differential game approach
- Optimal pattern of technology adoptions under embodiment: a multi-stage optimal control approach
- Environmental quality versus economic performance: A dynamic game approach
- Optimal Stopping Rules
- Temporary natural resource cartels
- Search by committee
Cited In (2)
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