Algorithms for maximum social welfare of online random trading
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6558686
DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2023.12.002MaRDI QIDQ6558686FDOQ6558686
Authors: Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Chenhao Wang, Xiaoying Wu, Mengqi Zhang
Publication date: 20 June 2024
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
- A Knapsack Secretary Problem with Applications
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions
- Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
- Algorithms for Secretary Problems on Graphs and Hypergraphs
- Online matching and ad allocation
- Improved algorithms and analysis for secretary problems and generalizations
- Secretary Problems via Linear Programming
- Online trading as a secretary problem
- Concentration inequalities for sampling without replacement
- An optimal online algorithm for weighted bipartite matching and extensions to combinatorial auctions
- SBBA: a strongly-budget-balanced double-auction mechanism
- The matroid secretary problem for minor-closed classes and random matroids
- An optimal truthful mechanism for the online weighted bipartite matching problem
- Online market intermediation
This page was built for publication: Algorithms for maximum social welfare of online random trading
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6558686)