Contracting over persistent information

DOI10.3982/TE5056MaRDI QIDQ6565786zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala

Publication date 2 July 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5056

zbMATH Keywords

contractdisclosuredynamicinformationpersuasionreceiverrevelationsender

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future
• Information design in multistage games
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Slow persuasion
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(3)

• Information design and reputations in the frequent-interaction limit
• Continuous-time persuasion by filtering
• Dynamic information design in an entry game

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