Delegation to incentivize information production

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.02.004MaRDI QIDQ6575501zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Cheng Li, Huangxing Mao

Publication date 20 July 2024

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionbiasdelegationorganizationsignal informativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Benefiting from bias: delegating to encourage information acquisition
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Delegating learning
• Motivating informed decisions
• Optimal Delegation

Cites work

• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3993492 (Why is no real title available?)
• Informational benefits of managerial myopia
• Optimal Delegation
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options

Cited in

(1)

• Benefiting from bias: delegating to encourage information acquisition

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