WhatsUpp with sender keys? Analysis, improvements and security proofs

DOI10.1007/978-981-99-8733-7_10zbMATH Open1547.94314MaRDI QIDQ6604932FDOQ6604932

Authors: David Balbás, Daniel Collins, Phillip Gajland 

Publication date: 13 September 2024

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zbMATH Keywords

Sender Keys protocolSender Keys+

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• A formal security analysis of the Signal messaging protocol
• The double ratchet: security notions, proofs, and modularization for the signal protocol
• Ratcheted encryption and key exchange: the security of messaging
• Towards bidirectional ratcheted key exchange
• Optimal channel security against fine-grained state compromise: the safety of messaging
• On secure ratcheting with immediate decryption
• Bidirectional Asynchronous Ratcheted Key Agreement with Linear Complexity
• Security analysis and improvements for the IETF MLS standard for group messaging
• On the price of concurrency in group ratcheting protocols
• Continuous group key agreement with active security
• CoCoA: concurrent continuous group key agreement
• Determining the core primitive for optimally secure ratcheting
• On the worst-case inefficiency of CGKA
• A more complete analysis of the signal double ratchet algorithm
• On the insider security of MLS
• WhatsUpp with sender keys? Analysis, improvements and security proofs

Cited In (5)

• WhatsUpp with sender keys? Analysis, improvements and security proofs
• End-to-end secure messaging with traceability only for illegal content
• Symmetric signcryption and E2EE group messaging in Keybase
• Ring signatures for deniable AKEM: Gandalf's fellowship
• Towards secure asynchronous messaging with forward secrecy and mutual authentication

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