Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
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Cites work
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- A course in game theory.
- Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
- Information structures with unawareness
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
Cited in
(34)- Awareness dynamics
- Game awareness: a questionnaire
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260807 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
- Speculation under unawareness
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- Inductive reasoning about unawareness
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- Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
- Preference-based unawareness
- Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
- Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
- Game theory with translucent players
- Extensive games with possibly unaware players
- Awareness and equilibrium
- Guessing the game: an individual's awareness and assessment of a game's existence
- Probabilistic unawareness
- Self-confirming games: unawareness, discovery, and equilibrium
- Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
- Multi-task agency with unawareness
- Universal type structures with unawareness
- An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness
- Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- Introduction to the special issue on unawareness
- Updating awareness and information aggregation
- Sub-models for interactive unawareness
- Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium in static games with unawareness
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