Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0276-8zbMath1247.91031MaRDI QIDQ662271

Joseph Y. Halpern, Leandro C. Rêgo

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0276-8

zbMATH Keywords

awareness; sequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91B14: Social choice

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Multi-task agency with unawareness, Probabilistic unawareness, Sub-models for interactive unawareness, Awareness dynamics, Speculation under unawareness, Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market, Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection, Unawareness -- a gentle introduction to both the literature and the special issue, Preference-based unawareness, Extensive games with possibly unaware players, Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions, Inductive reasoning about unawareness, Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior, Universal type structures with unawareness, Awareness and equilibrium

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